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Questions 
 What ways have civil society effectively promoted domestic social accountability, 
including holding executive to account in contexts of increased shrinkage of both civic 
and democratic space? 
 What approaches have donors used to better support civil society to promote domestic 
social accountability in these similar contexts, without doing more harm? 
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1. Overview  
This rapid review synthesises findings from rigorous academic, practitioner, and policy 
references on the role of civil society in promoting social accountability in authoritarian regimes 
and the ways donors can support them. The main geographic focus of this report is East Africa, 
with a secondary focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. In the African context civil society is best defined 
as ‘a public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity autonomous from but recognizing the 
legitimate existence of the state’ (Orvis, 2001: 20). Whereas social accountability is best defined 
as ‘an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is 
ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting 
accountability’ (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004: 1).  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union civil society has played an increasing role in the democracy 
process in Africa. However, civil society in Africa is still often based on ethnicity or religion, with 
the professional Western idea of civil society having less success in Africa due to lack of support. 
Success of professional civil society has thus been more closely aligned to technical aspects, 
such as participatory budget processes, where civil society tracks the government’s expenditure 
and holds them to account for lost funds and irresponsible spending. For this reason donors have 
seen success in offering technical training and have been encouraged to increase this element of 
aiding civil society. Due to this form of professional civil society often being relatively small and 
new in Africa, funding needs to be finely balanced, as it can harm the development of these 
groups and prevent them from forming their own ideologies, as well as building support and 
legitimacy. The large expectations from the Global North of civil society further damages its 
development, as they are often expected to do too much without being given the space to 
develop their own agenda. The media is an important part of civil society and can be a key actor 
in social accountability, however, in many African countries the media is not equipped to hold the 
government to account.  
The African version of civil society has seen great success from national conferences, where 
large numbers of civil society groups meet to hold the government to account. These national 
conferences are often led by religious leaders and have previously, in the case of Benin and 
Congo, even led to public impeachment of the country’s president. It has been argued that in 
authoritarian regimes, these ethnic and religious based civil society groups are more likely to be 
effective than the Western vision of professional civil society, as they are given more space to 
manoeuvre and have large support bases (Ottoway, 2000). Thus, donors have to make difficult 
decisions, based on local dynamics, in how they fund civil society, what they expect from these 
groups, and how they monitor success, in order to play a positive, rather than a negative, role in 
the development of civil society in these countries. 
The majority of the literature tends to focus on the role of civil society in Africa during the 
transitional period in the 1980s and 1990s, which due the changing political, economic, and 
societal dynamics is less relevant to the role civil society can play today. There is a lack of 
literature on contemporary African civil society and social accountability with the current focus 
more on the role of donors, or on civil society providing services that should otherwise be 
provided by the government. The literature brings up a number of examples of women groups 
and the role of civil society in increasing gender equality, however, this does not extend to 
include disabilities. 
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2. Definitional issues 
There are many debates around civil society in the African context, specifically whether the 
Western imported understanding of the concept fits within African society and thus the debate 
has been extended to how the term should be defined for the African context. White (1997: 379) 
gives a traditional definition of civil society and focuses on separation from the state and defines 
civil society as ‘an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by 
organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are 
formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values’.  Whereas 
Bratton (1994: 2) defines it in relation to Africa and allows room for more informal links in his 
definition, defining it as ‘a sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which 
is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks 
of public communication’. However, Orvis argues that the definition should be broader still in 
order to reflect the full array of African political and associational life, taking into account the often 
ethnic nature, and to move beyond civil society being viewed as a democratising element. Orvis 
(2001: 20) defines civil society as ‘a public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity 
autonomous from but recognizing the legitimate existence of the state’. He argues that this 
remains true to the Western development of civil society, but allows for the inclusion of patron-
client networks, ethnic associations, and some "traditional" authorities as part of civil society, 
making it representative of African society as a whole and also less likely to support liberal 
democracy. 
At the same time accountability and social accountability have different understandings. Cavill 
and Sahail (2004: 157) offer a broad definition of accountability as a whole and define it as ‘when 
agent A is accountable to agent B then agent A is obliged to inform agent B about agent A’s 
actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct’. Whereas McNeil and Mumvuma (2006: 5) define accountability in relation to the 
role of civil society and stress its vertical nature: ‘vertical accountability refers to the means 
whereby ordinary citizens, mass media, and civil society actors seek to enforce standards of 
good behavior and performance by public officials and service providers’. Malena, Forster and 
Singh (2004: 1) offer a more inclusive definition for social accountability and one that links well 
with Orvis’ understanding of African civil society, by opening up the process to indirect actors, 
they define it as ‘an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, 
i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or 
indirectly in exacting accountability’. Whilst Ahmad (2008) makes an important point in 
highlighting that although poor people, who rely on the government a great deal, are the greatest 
beneficiaries of effective social accountability, they are the least equipped to actually hold 
government to account.  
3. Civil Society and Social Accountability  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a wave of democratisation that spread through 
Africa and as a result many civil society groups and activities emerged, particularly the national 
conferences. It is argued that the emergence of civil society in Africa is closely tied to the 
adoption or consolidation of the market economy and political pluralism. As the Global North has 
made aid dependent on good governance, the role of civil society in Africa increased and they 
became an important part of the ‘democratisation’ wave in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s 
(UNESCO, 2009). 
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African civil society has had some issues with it being dominated by traditional, ascriptive, and 
kin-based groups such as clans, tribes, and ethnoreligious groups. These groups are able 
to harness large non-state networks and raise issues with the government. However, they act for 
a particular group rather than society as a whole. More recently modern and secular civil 
associations have formed which have been able to strengthen the process of holding the 
government to account, but have a weaker support base (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). 
Many large donors have supported the introduction of participatory budget processes, which 
operate alongside the public expenditure cycle and are based on the principle that budgets 
reflect the government’s policy decisions. Therefore, through making it easier for the population 
to access budget information the process can become more transparent, which in turn can 
minimise opportunities for clientelism and corruption. In Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys were used successfully in school budgeting. As a direct result of the process primary 
school enrolment increased from 3.6 million in 1996 to 6.9 million in 2001 and the share of the 
budget reaching the schools increased from a low of 20% in 1995 to 80% in 2001 (Ahmad, 2008) 
In the 1980s many non-governmental organizations were established in countries such as 
Nigeria, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe to monitor the human rights performance of their 
governments. Also, local chapters of Amnesty International had opened in Benin, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Zambia and Mauritius by the early 1990s. Many groups moved beyond human rights 
monitoring and began also monitoring elections. This was done through wider networks, such as 
a network of intellectuals and professionals in francophone West Africa and through umbrella 
groups of churches in East Africa. These organisations helped to keep their governments 
accountable and to educate the local populations on citizenship. Another element utilised by civil 
society in Africa, and having originated in Africa, is the national conference where national elites 
from the main segments of society meet to address the country’s political crisis and to formulate 
constitutional changes. In Benin and Congo these conferences were used to conduct a public 
impeachment of their president, stripping them of executive powers (Bratton, 1994). 
Christian churches and their national organisations have also played a significant role in social 
accountability in Africa. In Kenya, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) was a key 
voice of opposition to the authoritarianism of President Daniel arap Moi. They were a critical 
voice against the lack of a secret ballot, opposition arrests, lack of transparency, political 
repression and mismanagement of the economy. Christian groups have also fought 
authoritarianism and championed democracy in Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia. Religious leaders 
have also played an important part in the path towards democratisation by acting as non-political 
brokers between autocrats and those demanding democracy. For example, the Roman Catholic 
Bishop Ernest Nkombo of the Congo and Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo of Zaire were pivotal in 
the transitions and national conferences of their respective countries. In Togo Archbishop 
Fanoko Kpodzro was head of the sovereign national conference to chart the country’s political 
future (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). 
The media is an important part of civil society and can be a key actor in social accountability. 
However, in many African countries the media is not equipped to hold the government to account 
and there are also many laws in place to prevent them from doing so. For example, in Zimbabwe, 
staff of the Financial Gazette were arrested and charged under a pre-independence “criminal 
defamation” statute for reporting on the personal life of President Robert Mugabe, and have 
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continuously faced prosecution.
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 Whilst the Ivorian newspaper La Voie was suspended and 
senior staff were given two-year jail sentences for suggesting that the president’s presence at a 
football championship had brought the national team bad luck (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). However, 
with the development of technology and online reporting there is space for increasing the role the 
media and the diaspora can play in holding the government to account through online media 
outlets (Ottoway, 2000). 
Case Study: Zimbabwe 
Due to economic liberalisation in the country, the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and 
Network formed the Engendering National Budget (ENB) intervention, which, since September 
2001, has analysed and questioned Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic policies and actions from a 
gender perspective and with the aim of gaining gender-sensitive budgeting in the country. ENB 
has brought to light the severe inequalities in resource allocation and distribution among women 
and men (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006).  
Under similar principles, and due to accusations of corruption, Zimbabwe’s Centre for Total 
Transformation (ZCTT) tracks school fee expenditures, as children were being sent home from 
school and teachers were leaving due to non-payment. The rural population raised a loud public 
outcry about the mismanagement of school fees intended for the development of education and 
school facilities and the ZCTT’s intervention managed to address the issue. The Child Friendly 
National Budget Initiative was launched in 1999 by a consortium of non-government 
organisations under the National Association of Non Governmental Organisations (NANGO) 
umbrella, which analyses how resources are mobilised, allocated, and utilised in meeting 
children’s basic needs. As part of this initiative ZCTT uses community scorecards to monitor 
individual school fee expenditures, as well as baseline surveys, targeted focus groups, interviews 
with school principles, and workshops on school budgeting and expenditures. Much of the 
success of the initiative is due to the large network of NGOs involved in NANGO, with over 1000 
organisations participating. However, in the wider Child Friendly National Budget Initiative, 
access to information has been routinely blocked by the government who see these NGOs as 
allies of the opposition, and thus the process has been hindered (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006).  
NANGO has managed to remain an extremely inclusive consortium (which has partly bridged the 
gap between professional civil society and movement-based groups) that has enabled citizens to 
take some form of ownership of the budgeting process in Zimbabwe. NANGO uses workshops, 
both pre and post budget to mobilise citizens – particularly marginalised groups – to participate in 
its budget work. These workshops allow the wider community to make budget recommendations, 
which can then be relayed to the government, thus allowing these groups to have a say where 
they would otherwise be ignored. Members of parliament, chiefs, councillors, and governors also 
participate in the workshops, along with both rural and urban local communities, ensuring an 
inclusive process and that local voices are heard by those with the power to change policy 
(McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006).  
More recently, due to the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Zimbabwe, the resulting poor 
service delivery, and in an effort to promote transparency and accountability in local authorities, 
civil society organisations are focusing mainly on basic service delivery monitoring, community-
based planning, and budgeting. Through building citizen coalitions that engage with local 
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authorities on the delivery of water, sanitation, health, education and transport services, 
communities are developing their own community development plans, which include contextual 
and gender sensitive budgeting.  However, apart from residents associations, with their militancy 
and critical mass of a differentiated membership, many civil society groups lack the capacity to 
build relationships and coalitions to hold the local authorities to account. Moreover, these civil 
society groups are attempting to hold local authorities, rather than the government to account 
(Muchadenyika, 2017). Table 1 below demonstrates the tools (and their effectiveness) used by 
Zimbabwean civil society to hold local authorities to account. 
Table 1: Social Accountability Tools 
Tool Effectiveness 
Community Scorecards In Masvingo, this has facilitated residents’ feedback 
without victimization fears.  
In Nyanga, communities are suspicious of reprisals 
from politicians, and government officials. 
Service delivery satisfaction surveys 
 
Assisted in determining the extent to which residents 
are satisfied or dissatisfied with the delivery of major 
services (health, water, electricity and education). 
Social Service charters 
 
Local Authorities that were engaged are willing to adopt 
social service charters despite resistance from the local 
government ministry. Bulawayo managed to adopt a 
service charter. 
Sensitization meetings 
 
Have raised consciousness among young women on 
their rights and the need to demand for their fulfilment 
where gaps exist. 
Stakeholder surveys 
 
Helped to understand the power, positions and 
perspective of different stakeholders on how they 
influence the outcome of policy processes. 
Petitions 
 
Local authorities do not always respond. If they do 
respond they will be informing residents that there are 
no funds. 
Local evidence generation groups These generate evidence on advocacy and lobby 
issues. 
Source: (Muchadenyika, 2017: 188). 
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4. Donors 
Donors from the Global North see civil society as a way to promote democratic development in 
the Global South. Civil society is viewed by donors as a method of holding the governments 
accountable for their actions and as a means of ensuring better policies and implementation. 
Through funding civil society these donors aim to increase the capacity of these organisations to 
act as government watchdogs. This should also include aid towards the political milieu in order to 
ensure that there is an enabling environment for civil society to operate within (Jenkins, 2001).  
Many of the anti-poverty strategies instituted by donors in the 1990s have now become a driving 
external force behind social accountability initiatives in Africa. However, the external role in 
launching these initiatives has led to a lack of country ownership or further institutionalisation of 
the initiatives. A 2005 global review of these practices by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund highlighted the limited role they play in changing policy, particularly with regards 
to the macroeconomic framework and related structural reforms and thus more needs to be done 
to move them beyond participation and discussion and towards actual policy change (McNeil and 
Mumvuma, 2006). 
There are considerable capacity constraints in several African countries with regards to 
undertaking credible social accountability initiatives, mainly due to the lack of skilled personnel.  
For example, in Malawi civil society noted that they were failing to monitor the education budget 
properly due to the lack of technical capacity. The same issues were reported by the Zimbabwe 
Women’s Resource Centre and Network with regards to their capacity to undertake gender 
budget analysis. The lack of skilled staff and training programmes considerably constrains the 
work of these civil society organisations and it is argued that donor-led training would enhance 
their capacity to carry out social accountability. Moreover, these organisations lack the financial 
resources to effectively hold their governments to account, which in turn threatens the viability of 
social accountability initiatives in the region. For example, in Malawi the programme to monitor 
the fiscal 2001/2 and 2002/3 rounds of the budget monitoring exercise failed due to the lack of 
resources to efficiently undertake the task (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006).  
However, there is a fine line to balance with regards to funding, as over-dependence on foreign 
funding has many consequences too for the development of civil society, as they become 
accountable to donors rather than the people they represent. Additionally, it can endanger the 
local credibility of the organisations, as they can be dismissed as foreign agents rather than as 
voices of the people (Bratton, 1994). 
Through preserving individual liberties these civil society organisations contribute to engendering 
and maintaining democracy and promoting sound government policy and economic performance. 
This is one of the core aims of the funders, as it can create a cycle where rights to free 
association lead to better government policies, and development. However, there are issues with 
this model. Firstly, aid agencies expect too much of civil society, civil society is expected to play 
a pivotal role in (1) transitions to competitive politics, (2) the “consolidation” of fledgling 
democracies, and (3) the establishment of market-oriented economic policies, and subsequently 
positive developmental performance. However, in order to play a leading role in one of these 
objectives, the organisation would not be able to contribute to the others. In political aid, these 
agencies aim to fund organisations who they think can aid democracy, but in doing so they are 
going against the very policies they expect the governments to implement, as they are distorting 
the (political) market and creating their own version of rent-seeking. As a result, they are 
attracting more sinister actors who claim to be pro democracy. For example, USAID funded 
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Major Pierre Buyoya’s Foundation for Unity, Peace and Democracy for seminars among NGOs 
on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burundi. However, Buyoya went on to lead a 
military junta that ousted the civilian regime in a coup in 1996. Moreover, even groups that are 
committed to changing the course of an oppressive regime, are not necessarily in favour of the 
competitive politics that donors are seeking, as they have their own individual interests that they 
will be in the position to follow (partly in thanks to foreign capital) once the political situation 
becomes more fluid. This can cause further issues when civil society supports a political actor 
matching their interests and with whom they have disproportionate levels of influence. For 
example, in Zambia many civil society groups lent support to a newly installed democratic 
government under Frederick Chiluba, which engaged in tactics similar to those of the previous 
regime, but where they enjoyed more influence (Jenkins, 2001). 
Additionally, the aid of civil society by donors promotes political pluralism that is not rooted in 
social pluralism and does not have a social base – they are often the creation of donors and the 
market, rather than social demands for representation and policy change. These organisations 
become top-down, rather than bottom up organisations with very little links or connections to the 
people they are supposed to represent. For this reason, religious and ethnic civil society 
organisations in Africa often have far closer links to the people and are more representative of 
the people. However, they are more likely to disengage with the state and less likely to represent 
their members in the political process. Nonetheless, in more authoritarian regimes they are the 
more effective group, as they do not threaten the power of the government and have a large 
base, whereas the more professional NGOs do not have a large support base to mobilise and 
are restricted by the regime in their political actions. The mass support of the movement-based 
organisations becomes their tool in systems where it is difficult to manoeuvre politically, thus 
making religious and ethnic-based civil society groups more instrumental in authoritarian regimes 
in Africa. However, once the country becomes more democratic, these same organisations need 
to professionalise, whilst if a country is moving towards authoritarianism these organisations are 
better placed as movements rather than professional NGOs. In this respect civil society 
organisations were extremely successful in South Africa under the Apartheid regime, however, 
due to their lack of professionalisation they were less successful post-Apartheid. Organisations 
that are representative often have more immediate concrete goals than the ideal of democracy, 
whilst organisations that reflect donors’ views are not representative and are dependent on 
donors. Donors have to make decisions on funding based on the local dynamics and political 
system, in an authoritarian regime, not only are professional NGOs unlikely to make much 
political inroads, they also starve the more effective movement-based groups of leadership as 
they hire the highly-skilled locals (Ottoway, 2000). 
Robinson (1995) argues that there are a number potential issues with donors funding civil society 
in Africa with the idea of increasing democracy. Firstly, many of these civil society organisations 
are small and often new and thus do not necessarily have the capacity to receive large amount 
of, which could actually prevent them from having the time to map out and develop their 
objectives, build up their support, and increase their legitimacy. Secondly, it takes time for civil 
society to harness change, particularly in many African countries where the conditions are not 
suitable for rapid growth in civil society. Thus, the assistance provided by donors does not 
necessarily lead to change, as more time is needed in order to build the organisational capacity 
and to develop its ideological stance. Thirdly, it is difficult to assess the true contribution of civil 
society organisations and the insistence by donors for rigorous monitoring procedures can divert 
to organisations’ focus away from their principle goals. 
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A further issue with supporting civil society in authoritarian regimes is that these regimes can use 
protest spaces as a way of managing dissent. Authoritarian governments have limited sources of 
information about dissatisfied lower ranking officials or about the society as a whole. Through 
allowing civil society to operate they keep discontented communities out in the open rather than 
driving them underground. Thus, permitting the operation of civil society and protests can be 
used as a tool to manage discontent. Additionally, these regimes often push, or allow, civil 
society to focus on narrower, local issues, rather than broader issues that may threaten the 
government (Lorentzen, 2013). 
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